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Are African Governments as Unproductive as the Accelerated Development
Report Implies?
Christopher Coiclough
During the past two decades, most African
governments rightly focussed on political con-
solidation, on the laying down of basic infra-
structure . . . and on the development of human
resources. Relatively less attention was paid to
production. Now it is essential to give production a
higher priority - without neglecting these other
goals.
To speed up development and make their
economies more 'national', the new governments
expanded the public sector, It is now widely evident
that the public sector is over-extended, given the
present scarcities of financial resources, skilled
manpower and organisational capacity. This has
resulted in slower growth than might have been
achieved with available resources, and accounts in
part for the current crisis.
Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa:
an Agenda for Action
[World Bank 1981:4,5]
Introduction
The core prescriptions of the Report for achieving a
resumption of growth in African economies are: first,
to reform the structure of incentives, and in particular
to allow the free market greater influence in resource
allocation. Second, to reduce the size and to reform
the role of government. The latter, which we are
concerned with here, is aptly indicated by the
quotations reproduced above. This article addresses
two main questions: what evidence is there for
claiming that the public sector in Africa is 'over-
extended'? Would its contraction facilitate the
increase in production which the Report is concerned
to achieve?
Government 'Size' and Economic
Performance
The 'size' of government is not an unambiguous
concept. One might think of the number of employees
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in the public sector, the magnitude of public spending,
taxation or revenues, or of the extent of influence and
involvement of government in total economic activity.
The Report appears to associate 'size' with each of
these variables at different times. The magnitude of
the budget in relation to national resources would,
however, be of central importance to any general
critique of the size of government. Although the
Report does not analyse public spending in Africa in
relation to that in other regions, it is possible from the
data in the Report to present such a comparison. The
results are instructive.
Table ¡ compares aspects of government expenditure
and other economic indicators for 35 countries in
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as well as for all countries,
grouped according to low, middle and high income
levels. The table shows that African countries have
performed less well in terms of food production and
general economic growth over the last two decades,
and that they remain more dependent upon
agriculture and are less industrialised than countries in
other regions. However, when one considers govern-
ment expenditure, the median values shown suggest
that there is no significant diference between the
proportion of GDP accounted for by public spending
in low and middle income states in SSA, as compared
to all such countries. In all groups government
expenditure typically accounts for about one quarter
of GDP. Moreover, as regards the functional
breakdown of such expenditures, the median values
for the two low income groupings reveal a remarkable
correspondence. Almost exactly the same proportions
of expenditure are typically allocated to defence,
education, health, social security, other social services
and economic services in African as in other low
income countries. For the two groups of middle
income countries, also, the proportions under each
heading are not dissimilar, although the SSA group
typically allocates more to general administration,
education, agriculture and roads, and less to defence
These differences may partly be related to income, since the mean
value for GNP per capita for the African middle income countries is
little more than one-third the value for all such countries. See
Table 1.
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Comparison between African and other countries on the basis of selected economic indicators
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and social security than middle income countries in
other regions.1
It is interesting in this connection to note that the
proportion of GDP accounted for by government
expenditure in the industrialised countries of the
world is almost twice that typical of the poorer
countries, including SS. This high ratio is strongly
influenced by the very large transfer payments for
social security and welfare purposes which occur in the
industrialised world. If one excludes these transfers,
the remaining expenditure typically accounts for
Data are for 35 African countries. Oil exporters are excluded.
Weighted means.
Medians. Central government expenditure only. Parastatal operations included only to the extent that financial surpluses are transferred to the
Treasury. Excludes debt service.
Source: World Bank 1981, Tables 1, 3,40 and 41.
about 26 per cent of GDP This is again very similar to
the proportions found in poorer countries. Thus, it
seems that both the proportion of GDP spent by
African governments, and the functional breakdown
of these expenditures, represent typical expenditure
patterns of other governments.
This conclusion itself suggests that the size of
government, at least as measured by the proportion of
GDP accounted for by public spending, is unlikely to
explain the poor growth performance of African
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countries compared with those in other regions. It is
useful to ask, however, whether differential growth
performance within SSA is related in any way to
differences in aggregate public spending. Table 2
compares the growth performance of 20 countries
with the proportion of GDP accounted for by
expenditure on public administration and defence.
Inspection of the table reveals that there is no apparent
relationship between these variables. Countries with
high public expenditure ratios are as likely to
experience moderate economic growth as those with
low ratios. In summary, therefore, the statistical
evidence on government spending available in the
Report itself, provides no basis for the conclusion
made by its authors that the rapid expansion of
government activities has resulted in slower growth in
SSA countries than would otherwise have been
achieved.
Even if there is no empirical evidence to support the
view that the expansion of the public sector has led to
slower growth, it remains true, of course, that the
resources employed by governments have associated
opportunity costs. The mobilisation of resources by
government precludes their use elsewhere in the
economy, and the financing of government activity
(primarily through taxation) will have negative effects
upon output in other sectors. Thus, it is equally true
that output in the private sector could be increased if
the cost of government services were reduced, if
unnecessary services were eliminated, or if existing
services could be better or more cheaply provided by
Table 2
Comparison of the proportions of GDP spent upon
public administration and defence with GDP growth
rates, 1970-79'
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20 countries are included. Data show the unweighted mean
values for each quartile, ranked on the basis of the proportion of
GDP spent on public administration and defence (column 1).
Source: calculated from World Bank, 1981, Table 42.
non-government agencies. It is for these reasons that,
irrespective of the historical record, the World Bank
no doubt believes itself to be on firm ground in arguing
for a reduced future role for governments in Africa.
This diagnosis nevertheless suffers from a number of
problems. In emphasising the importance of the trade-
off between the size of the government budget and that
of private savings one should take care not to beg
important questions concerning the use of savings by
the private sector or the direct and indirect effect of
public spending on production of marketed goods and
services. In a number of SSA countries, reducing
corporate taxation would do less to increase private
domestic investment than it would to encourage
enhanced repatriation of profits by foreign-owned
enterprises. In others, it is by no means clear that
increments to investment undertaken by the private
sector have as much impact upon domestic welfare (as
opposed to output measured in the conventional way)2
as would equal increments to public expenditure.
What Private Alternatives?
In a more practical sense, most of the activities now
undertaken by African public sectors would, if
governments suspended these activities, either not be
done at all, or would be taken over by foreign, as
opposed to domestically-owned enterprise. The search
for an indigenous private sector which has the capital
and manpower resources to occupy the space offered
by a retreating government is unlikely to be successful.
For example, in almost all countries where the
government is involved in managing and financing
major industrial ventures, such management was
initially undertaken as a result of nationalisation of
foreign-owned private corporations that had been
operating domestically prior to independence. It is
extremely unlikely that indigenous capitalists yet exist
in sufficient numbers to take over more than a few of
these enterprises in the event of their privatisation,
even if that is deemed to be desirable. Moreover, the
terms that would have to be offered to attract foreign
capital into these ventures once again, would be
unlikely to increase the absolute value of retained
domestic benefits arising from their operations.
This is also true of government enterprises which were
not created as a result of nationalisation. These
typically include power, water and housing cor-
porations, railways, airways and agricultural market-
ing organisations. In most countries their transfer to
private hands would involve a re-introduction of
foreign capital and management, with the exception
2 In some cases even the impact on GDP may be higher. Effective
education, health, transport and agricultural extension spending
offer examples.
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(for some activities) of a small group of middle-income
SSA countries (including perhaps Kenya, Nigeria,
Zimbabwe) where well-developed indigenous private
sectors have become established. In response to the
view that the private sector should take on more of the
activities presently conducted by government, the
crucial question is: does an indigenous private sector
with sufficient resources and experience to do so yet
exist? Inmost cases the answer will be in the negative.3
What Is To Be Cut?
Perhaps because its authors are aware of some of these
difficulties, the sections of the Report that deal with
the parastatal sector advocate a broadly sensible set of
measures to improve its efficiency, rather than its
devolution from public ownership. Much more
worrying, however, is that the main area which the
Report recommends should increasingly be taken over
by non-government agencies is the provision of basic
services. Specifically, the Report argues that direct
payment for government services in the areas of
irrigation, health, and education should be sought.
Villagers should increasingly be expected to finance
medicines, schools, clinics, the construction of
classrooms, pumps and wells. Private schools and
clinics are advocated.
The reasons why the Bank feels that these are the main
areas where cuts in government expenditure can be
This of course begs the question of whether the World Rank's
Agenda is actually, as it asserts, neutral as to political and economic
goals. Arguing for selectivity and efficiency in public enterprise may
be consistent with some models of transition to socialism. General
privatisation of industry, finance, commerce, transport and energy
enterprises would seem to require a commitment to capitalism.
Education is critical to increased production and participation and
has made impressive advances, despite some macro policy - and
micro empirical! - errors. (Primary school in Mozambique)
satisfactorily made are not at all clear. Evidence
suggests that fully or partially cost-covering charges
for education and health services will result in large
numbers of rural families being unable or unwilling to
use such services. Moreover, allocating responsibility
for their organisation and provision to village groups
or private interests will in most cases result in a
significant deterioration in the quality of the services
provided. Thus, suggestions to shift the cost of
providing basic services from government to the
individuals who use them imply a reduction in the
quantity and quality of services available to rural
populations.
Yet the evidence for the productive value of
expenditures upon basic education and health services
is now overwhelming. The social rates of return
attached to investment in education are widely
dQcumented. Available evidence clearly shows that
the provision of primary schooling in particular is a
highly profitable social investment. Similar points can
be made in the health sector, particularly where
nutritional levels are low. In such circumstances it is
difficult to see how expenditure cuts in these areas
could be generally justifiable.
It is as though the authors of the Report view all
government recurrent expenditure as consumption'
(in a real, rather than merely a national-accounting
sense). This, indeed, is suggested by the first quotation
reproduced at the beginning of this article. To pose
such a sharp distinction between the development of
human resources and the attention to be paid by policy
makers to production strongly suggests that the purely
economic value of investment in human resources is
either being forgotten or ignored.
Effective health provision requires paramedical education, pre-
ventative and curative services in rural areas. Sick people cannot
produce enough. (Village health worker and patients in Zambia)
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Perhaps the most striking aspect of these recom-
mendations is that they appear to represent a clear
volte face when compared with the central tendency of
World Bank research and policy over the last decade.
It is difficult to believe that the Report has been
produced by the same organisation which has so often
proclaimed (at least since Mr McNamara's Nairobi
address in 1973) that growth does not necessarily
imply development; that absolute poverty must be
eradicated; that measures to improve income
distribution are central concerns; and that the basic
needs of the rural and urban poor must be urgently
addressed. Public expenditures upon the provision of
basic services have, in this sense, one very useful
characteristic. They not only increase labour pro-
ductivity, but the returns to these investments flow
mainly to the users of the services concerned. In the
case of poor rural and urban populations, therefore,
government expenditures simultaneously promote
both growth and distributional goals. If development
in SSA is to be accelerated, government expenditures
on these items must be increased in real terms over the
medium-run. Ironically, the proposals for financing
basic services made by the Report threaten to
undermine - indeed to reverse - this process.4
Are There Alternatives?
If these central aspects of the Report's recom-
mendations on the size of government are misguided,
what, then, should have been given greater attention?
There is no doubt that government budgets in Africa
will have to be adjusted in the face of dramatically
changed external circumstances. The problem is how
to achieve this, whilst protecting, and even increasing,
investments in the physical and human assets upon
which the long-term growth of productivity in Africa
depends. It will be recalled that budget reductions are
primarily achieved by reduction in the cost of services,
elimination of unnecessary activities, or by passing on
some service functions to non-government agencies.
The Report concentrates almost exclusively upon the
last of these options, together with measures to
improve efficiency in the public sector (mainly those
which would improve output at existing cost levels,
rather than upon those which would bring budgetary
reliefperse). Thus, a range of alternative measures are
virtually ignored. The two most serious omissions are
the lack of attention it gives to changing the sectoral
allocation of budgetary resources, and its complete
neglect of any serious analysis of the wage and salary
structure.
The reversal may be counterproductive in an additional sense.
There is evidence that lack of access to education, basic health
services and pure water are serious disincentives to living in rural
areas. If so, making them increasingly available - physically andin
terms of cost - would appear to deserve attention as an incentive to
increased agricultural output.
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As regards the first of these, the data in Table 1 shows
that typically, up to one third of central government
expenditure in Africa is allocated to general
administration and defence. The proportion spent
upon general administration is somewhat higher than
that of other countries; defence expenditures compared
with other regions are about the same for low-income
countries, and somewhat less for the SSA middle-
income group. Prima facie these items are expensive in
both absolute and proportional terms. They could be
reduced with minimal effects upon welfare, and the
resources released could be allocated more pro-
ductively within the public budget to education, health
and economic services. Alternatively, they could
enable some substitution of private investment for
public current expenditures. Obviously this type of
analysis raises both classification questions (especially
within general administration) and major political
issues - but, arguably, no more so than those
prescriptions in the Report which focus upon cuts in
social spending. At least one African state did make
10,000 administrators redundant in the mid 1970s and
is attempting to cut nominal defence spending by over
a third this year. At least some serious discussion of
these issues would have pointed more forcefully to the
real choices facing African governments in the area of
budgetary priorities.
Second, and much more surprising, is that the Report
makes no more than passing reference to the need for
changes in the wage and salary structure.5 As a result,
since the wage and salary bill represents a very high
proportion of total government spending in all
countries, the Report gives no serious attention to
ways of reducing the costs of government services.
There are three major reasons why such analysis is
needed in the context of a discussion about the
problems of adjustment in SSA economies. First, a
real wage and salary cut over a one or two-year period
presents one of the best opportunities for significant
reductions in government expenditures over a short
period. For example, a real cut of 10 per cent would
bring savings equal to those which would be gained
from the elimination of the whole of the defence
budget in many SSA states. Second, it is completely
unsatisfactory to analyse economic policy options
without some discussion of which sections of the
population are to carry the adjustment burden. In fact,
the prescriptions of the Report would involve the
heaviest costs being shouldered by the poorest
members of the population. Small-holders have
suffered declining incomes throughout Africa, because
One example cited - primary teacher wages (p 83) is perhaps not
very fortunately chosen. Compared to GNP per household these
range from 0.8 to 5.5 times as high, with 1.2 to 1.5 typical. This is
well below levels for most petty administrative and semi-skilled
production jobs.
of droughts, wars and, to some extent, declining
terms-of-trade. Adding to this the need to pay directly
for publicly provided education, medical, irrigation
and agricultural services is no small additional cost.
Unless real wages and, especially, salaries are reduced,
further budgetary adjustment can only be achieved by
retrenchment. Thus newly impoverished people would
be created whilst the incomes of those who remain in
jobs would be protected. The lack of attention given to
the wage and salary issue implies that the whole
question of the distribution of the adjustment burden
is completely overlooked.6
Finally, there is the question of the relationship
between wages and the exchange rate. The Report
correctly points out that exchange rates in Africa are
typically over-valued, and recommends their down-
ward adjustment. It argues that the exchange rate is a
powerful tool for the correction of relative prices. It
does not consider, however, that the extent to which
nominal wages are allowed to move upwards to
compensate for the inflationary impact of exchange
rate movements can seriously modify, and in some
cases even eliminate, the beneficial effects of
devaluation in this sense. Thus in cases where unions
are strong, or where there is a tradition of adjusting
wages in line with prices, some change in the
government's stance on wages policy will be required
in addition to exchange rate manipulation. Otherwise
devaluation may not have the positive effects upon
6 In certain cases the problem may take the form of rapid government
employment growth, financed in part by falling real wages and
salaries. Malawi and Tanzania (where the share of wages and
salaries in the recurrent budget appears to have fallen from 60 per
cent in 1961 to 30 per cent in 1981) may be examples. In such cases
cutting down on new government hiring may be the most critical
saving possible.
output, employment and government expenditure
which are envisaged by the Report.
Toward a Different Agenda for Action
In conclusion, therefore, we can say that there is no
clear evidence that African public sectors are over-
extended relative to the proportional size of
government budgets in other parts of the world. Nor
have those countries in which government expenditure
accounts for a smaller proportion of GDP performed
better in terms of economic growth than other
countries. It is nevertheless clear that government
budgets will need to be trimmed, relative to GDP and,
in some cases, absolutely over the short/medium term,
in response to deteriorating external economic
circumstances, the balance of payments difficulties
which these have helped to create and resultant
weakening of revenue bases. In this regard, we have
found the Report seriously lacking in its analysis of the
policy choices faced by SSA governments. In
particular it places too much emphasis upon measures
which would effectively reduce the availability of basic
services to African populations, and insufficient
emphasis upon measures to change the sectoral
structure of government spending, and to reduce the
costs of public services. In particular, the lack of
attention paid to needed changes in the wage and
salary structure is a major omission in both analytic
and policy terms.
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